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Climate change policy involves complex legal,1 physical, and economic
issues that affect both domestic and foreign policy.2 One important
aspect of climate change is the connection between energy and water.
Moving potable water to where it is needed and processing wastewater
requires electric power, which is generated by burning fossil fuels.
These water-related activities result in the production of greenhouse
gases (GHGs), which are emitted into the atmosphere.3 In California,
1. In the past few decades, approximately 30% of the carbon dioxide generated
by human activities has been absorbed in the oceans. In 2009, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) agreed to review the petition by the Center for Biological Diversity
(CBD) on the use of federal Clean Water Act (CWA) to address ocean acidification.
Ocean acidification results from the lowering of the ocean’s pH (making it more
acidic) after seawater absorbs and reacts with carbon dioxide, which is a greenhouse gas
(GHG) generated by power plants. The increased ocean acidity impairs the calcification
process used by marine animals, such as crabs and abalone and coral, to build and
maintain their protective shells and skeletons needed to survive. In addition to threatening
marine life with protective shells, ocean acidification upsets the delicately balanced
marine food chain. It may also adversely affect the metabolic, immune, and reproductive
functions of other marine life. Climate Change and the Clean Water Act—Environmental
Group Petitions EPA to Address Ocean Water Quality, Environmental Liability Enforcement
and Penalties Reporter, Regulatory Developments, M arch 2008, at 106; see Common
Dreams.org, http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2009/01/27-6 (last visited Feb.
10, 2009).
The petition raises novel, as well as provocative, legal claims. It asks the EPA to use
the CWA to address climate change and ocean water quality. Section 304 requires the
EPA to revise the national water quality criteria “from time to time” to reflect the “latest
scientific knowledge.” Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2009). The EPA developed
the water quality criteria for pH in 1976, before climate change and ocean acidification
were on the national agenda. It is time, according to the CBC, to develop new pH criteria.
Assuming new pH criteria are forthcoming, additional legal issues must be resolved.
The CWA regulates “point source” discharges to navigable waters. Id. § 1362(12).
Because carbon dioxide is ubiquitous, and therefore is not traceable to a discrete point
source, it is likely that the discharge would be classified as a non-point source (NPS),
which is not directly regulated by the CWA. But states regulate NPS’s of pollution. In
addition, states are required by the CWA to adopt water quality standards (WQS) that are
at least as protective as those adopted by the EPA. Id. § 303. This WQS requirement may
be the legal theory for using the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) program discussed later in this article.
The CBD also is pushing coastal states take action on ocean acidification under the
state anti-degradation water quality policies and under the Total Daily M aximum Load
(TM DL) program of section 1313(d), which requires states to designate water bodies that
do not meet WQS as impaired and to have plans to address the impairment. Id.
§ 1313(d)(2).
2. Profound political, social, and economic consequences to controlling GHGs have
been recognized for some time. It is hard to imagine any environmental issue having
greater “economic and political significance” than regulation of climate change activities. 68
Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,928 (Sept. 8, 2003). Climate change has been, and continues to be,
the subject of debate and negotiation by international bodies, thus raising important
foreign policy concerns. See 68 Fed. Reg. 52,931. Domestic policy also is directly affected
because virtually every sector of the U.S. economy is either directly or indirectly a source of
GHG emissions.
3. See generally Center for Biological Diversity v. Brennen, 571 F.Supp.2d 1105
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that the federal officials, who violated the Global Change
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for example, roughly 20% of the total electrical demand is used to pump
water to consumers and to process wastewater at sewage treatment
plants.
The focus of this Article is on a subtler, but no less important, part of
the climate-change story involving energy and water. The focus is on
the federal regulation of existing once-through-cooling (OTC)4 intake
structures that are used by large steam electric-generating power plants.5
OTC, closed-cycle (CC)6 cooling, and dry-cooling (DC)7 each perform
Research Act (GCRA), were directed to issue the research plan and scientific assessment
as directed by the GCRA.) The Climate Change Science Program’s subsequent study observed,
among other things, that “it is well established through formal attribution studies that the
global warming of the past 50 years is due primarily to human-induced increases in heattrapping gases.” Thomas R. Karl et al., Weather and Climate Change Extremes in a Changing
Climate: Executive Summary, The U.S. Climate Change Science Program at 1, http://www.
climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap3-3/final-report/sap3-3-final-ExecutiveSummary.pdf
(last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
4. The OTC system that is the focus of this article is the type designed to withdraw
water from a natural or other water source, use it at the facility to support contact and/or
noncontact cooling uses, and then discharge it to a waterbody without recirculation. 40
C.F.R. § 125.93 (2009).
5. The power plants analyzed in this article have a design intake flow of 50
million gallons per day (M GD) or greater, and are regulated under section 316(b) of the
NPDES program of the CWA. Of the 554 power plants identified by the EPA as subject
to section 316(b), approximately 25% use estuary/tidal rivers, or the ocean as the source
water for cooling and 44% use fresh water rivers. See EPA, Economic and Benefits
Analysis for the Final Section 316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, A3–18, Table
A3–8 (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/316b/phase2/econbenefits/
final/a3.pdf.
6. The majority of new steam-electric power plants coming on line in the last several
years have used the CC technology. Compared to OTC systems, CC systems can reduce
the amount of the cooling source water by as much as 93%-96% depending on various
site-specific characteristics and design specifications.
A CC recirculating system is one designed, using minimized make-up and blowdown
flows, to withdraw water from a natural or other water source to support contact and/or
noncontact cooling uses within a facility. The water is typically sent to a cooling canal or
channel, lake, pond, or tower to allow waste heat to be dissipated to the atmosphere. It is
then returned to the system for reuse. New or additional source water (make-up water) is
added to the system to replenish any losses that have occurred due to blowdown, drift,
and evaporation. Water is added to the system to replace water lost principally through
evaporation. Design conditions as well as climatic conditions influence the amount of
water to makeup lost water volumes. 40 C.F.R. § 125.93.
CC systems significantly reduce the impingement and entrainment losses. There is no
environmental free lunch, however. The evaporative drift from the cooling tower is one
concern. The water vapor in the evaporative drift contains the same chemical properties,
bacteria, volatile organic compounds, particulate matter, and other constituents contained in
the cooling source water. In addition, biocides and other materials added by plant operators
may also escape during the cooling process. Another environmental concern is the “blow
down” discharge from the cooling tower. All constituents not contained in the evaporative
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the same function, which is the removal of waste heat from the steam
cycle after it has generated electricity.
OTC systems are widely used 8 and relatively inexpensive when
compared to CC or DC systems.9 Nevertheless, mounting regulatory
pressure requires existing power plants to abandon OTC in favor of
more marine-friendly cooling systems.10 The driving force behind this
movement is the fact that OTC causes damage to the aquatic environment.11
The environmental damage from OTC occurs when the cooling source
water is drawn into the power plant12 and also when it is discharged as
process, must ultimately be discharged. In addition, aesthetic concerns with the cooling tower
and vapor plume also must be considered. Finally, CC systems are not as economically
efficient to operate as OTC systems, so any capacity loss must be made up by burning
more fuel, which contributes to the GHG problem.
7. DC systems do not cool the waste heat by water cooling. Rather, they use
convection and radiation to directly transfer waste heat to the surrounding air. To assure
adequate air movement, fans are used to circulate the air. Although these systems eliminate
the need for a continuous source of cooling water, they do use some water to generate
steam to produce power that is then recirculated between the generators and the cooling
system.
DC systems eliminate the impingement and entrainment losses, and also reduce the
thermal discharge to the receiving water. But DC also comes with an environmental price.
The capital costs are higher than they are for competing cooling systems, and because
they are less efficient to operate, increased fuel consumption is required to generate an
equivalent amount of power than an OTC power plant.
8. The 554 power plants using OTC account for approximately 53% of the nation’s
electric power generating capacity. See EPA, Economic and Benefits Analysis for the
Final Section 316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, A3–18, Table A3–8 (Feb. 2004),
available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/316b/phase2/econbenefits/final/a3.pdf.
9. See discussion infra note 78.
10. In California, for example, both the Ocean Protection Council and the State
Lands Commission have passed resolutions calling for the expeditious phase out of OTC.
See SB 42, § 1(d), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_00010050/sb_42_bill_20090106_introduced.html (last visited M arch 5, 2009).
11. The following news report about damage from OTC is illustrative: “Despite
legal threats from the city of San Francisco and protests from environmentalists,
regulators have no plans to stop a local power plant from using a cooling system that
kills fish, discharges heated water into the bay and stirs up sediment that can be harmful
both to wildlife and people . . . One of the generators, known as Unit 3, draws in millions
of gallons of water per day from the bay, killing an undetermined number of fish. After
being run through the plant, the now-heated water is discharged back into the bay where,
studies show, it stirs up harmful substances such as copper, dioxin, mercury and PCBs.
The 40-year-old plant is the subject of a larger, long-running debate about whether it
should be retrofitted or closed in favor of a new and cleaner plant.” Robert Selna, Power
plant has no plans to s top k illing fis h, S. F . C H R O N ., J an. 2, 2009, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/01/02/BAAS151F1U.DTL (last visited
Jan. 1, 2009).
12. An OTC system is estimated to entrain some 3.65 million organisms per year.
By comparison, a CC cooling entrains about 180,000, and DC entrains approximately
6,570 organisms. CC wet cooling systems use 96%-98% less fresh water (and 70%-96%
less salt water) than similarly situated OTC, and DC systems, in turn, use 95% less water
than closed-cycle systems. Final Rule, 66 Fed.Reg. at 65,273; Public Comment &
Response No. 206.012 at 1881.
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thermal effluent.13 The thermal discharge is harmful because the heated
water alters the physical and chemical characteristics of the receiving
water body and, therefore, adversely alters the temperature and aquatic
habitat of the dispersal zone of the water body.
OTC also causes environmental damage when the cooling water is
drawn into the power plant’s intake structure. These structures have
grills or screens at the mouth of the intake to prevent large objects from
being sucked into the plant, which would damage the cooling condenser.
When the cooling water passes through these intake structures, marine
life in the source water gets trapped against the intake grills or screens,
which results in their impingement and death. Smaller forms of marine
life, such as fish eggs and larvae, that pass through the grills or screens
are drawn into the power plant’s cooling system. Few marine organisms
survive the gauntlet of traveling through the condenser cooling system.
They are subject to entrainment in the cooling system from the mechanical,
thermal, and associated operational stresses, such as exposure to toxic
antifouling agents.
Power plants using OTC withdraw hundreds of billions of gallons of
water daily from the nation’s waters for cooling purposes.14 In the process,
billions of aquatic organisms are destroyed each year by impingement
and entrainment.15 The actual number is difficult to precisely determine
without comprehensive monitoring, which does not exist. Nevertheless,
the mortality rate—primarily a function of the amount of marine life in
the cooling source water, the velocity of the water taken into the power
plant, and the temperature exchange rate—has been estimated.
The elimination of OTC systems would have a salutatory effect on the
aquatic environment because fewer marine organisms would be destroyed
by impingement and entrainment. But there are non-water quality impacts
associated with realizing this benefit. The shift to other currently available
cooling systems, which are not as economically efficient in generating
electricity, will inevitably result in higher electricity rates. Given the
struggling economy, shifting this added cost to consumers is not likely
to be embraced with enthusiasm.

13. A thermal discharge alters the natural temperature of the receiving water. The
actual impact is influenced by a variety of factors, including the location, the volume, the
temperature, and the frequency of the discharge.
14. EPA Rules and Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,576 (July 9, 2004).
15. For example, a single power plant may impinge more than a million adult fish
in a three-week period. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 181 (2d Cir. 2004).
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Another cost also must be considered. The elimination of OTC will
result in an energy penalty in the form of increased GHGs. The U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that on average twenty
additional 400-MW plants might have to be built nationally to replace
the generating capacity lost by replacing OTC systems.16 The greatest
increase in GHGs from this replacement is likely to occur during the
summer when local air pollution problems are the most severe. Unless
alternative fuels, such as solar energy, are used to meet the increased
demand for electricity or some other technological fix is found, such as
carbon sequestration and storage, the elimination of OTC will inevitably
mean that more fossil fuels will be burned by steam-generating power
plants to produce the equivalent amount of electricity.
Are the added costs worth the benefits? The policy dilemma is that, in
securing the environmental benefits (an improved aquatic environment),
new environmental problems (the generation of additional GHGs) are
created. At the center of this OTC environmental tradeoff dilemma is
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, more popularly known as the
Clean Water Act (CWA).17
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for
administering the CWA. This federal law directs the EPA to develop
effluent limitations, which are most commonly expressed in numeric or
narrative terms, for the discharge of pollutants to “waters of the United
States.”18

16. The DOE has estimated that converting existing fossil-fuel facilities from OTC
to wet-cooling towers, for example, would produce 2.4% to 4.0% less electricity while
burning the same amount of coal. For at least one nuclear power plant, which provides
78% of the electricity consumed by the State of Vermont, the energy penalty associated
with converting to cooling towers was estimated to be 5.3%. 69 Fed. Reg. 41,605 (July
9, 2004).
17. See generally Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2009). The CWA
establishes the basic structure for regulating the discharges of pollutants into the waters
of the United States and for regulating water quality standards. Congress enacted the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act 1948, but it was significantly reorganized and
expanded in 1972. The “Clean Water Act” became its more common name with amendments
in 1977. Summary of the Clean Water Act, http://www.epa.gov/regulations/laws/cwa.html
(last visited Jan. 9, 2009).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). The United States Supreme Court continues to struggle
with determining whether certain “waters” fit within the definition of navigable waters.
See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
531 U.S. 159 (2001); see generally Rapanos v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 547 U.S.
715 (2006). Because the power plants subject to regulation under the CWA discharge to
jurisdictional waters, this definitional difficulty is beyond our concern.
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The CWA regulates thermal discharges, as well as the discharge of
other pollutants, to the nation’s waters pursuant to the provisions contained
in sections 301 (applicable to existing facilities) or 306 (applicable to
new facilities). CWA section 316(b) governs cooling water intake
structures, including OTC systems.19 It requires that “the location,
design, construction, and capacity of the cooling water intake structures
reflect the best technology available (BTA) for minimizing adverse
environmental impact.”20 Congress impliedly recognized that some level
of adverse environmental impact will occur because it specified minimizing
the adverse environmental impact but not eliminating it.
Section 316(b) lies at the heart of the OTC debate. Congress, unfortunately,
did not define the meaning of the critical words “best” or “available” or
“minimizing.” It left unstated the substantive standards or methods that
the EPA should use in determining BTA. The role, if any, that a costbenefit comparative analysis should play was also left unstated by
Congress. The uncertainty surrounding the appropriate meaning of these
words, as well as how to go about determining BTA, has provided an
open invitation to disagreement.
Some guidance on the general role of cost-benefit analysis has been
provided by the executive branch of government. Recent Presidential
Executive Orders have required the federal agencies to consider costs
and benefits in formulating the regulations those agencies are tasked
with developing. President Clinton, for example, issued Executive
Order 12866 on regulatory planning and review, and the use of costbenefit analysis:
In deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess all costs and benefits
of available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating.
Costs and benefits shall be understood to include both quantifiable measures (to
the fullest extent that these can be usefully estimated) and qualitative measures
of costs and benefits that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider.
Further, in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select
t hos e ap p roaches t hat maximiz e net benefit s (including p ot ent ial
economic, environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages; distributive
impacts; and equity), unless a statute requires another regulatory approach . . .

19. See Karl R. Rábago, What Comes Out Must Go In: Cooling Water Intakes and
the Clean Water Act, 16 HARV. ENVTL . L. REV. 429, 433 (1992); see also James R. M ay
& M aya K. van Rossum, The Quick and the Dead: Fish Entrainment, Entrapment, and
the Application of Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, 20 VT. L. REV. 373, 377
(1995).
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b).
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Each agency shall assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation
and, recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose
or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the
intended regulation justify its costs.21

The caveat, “unless a statute requires another regulatory approach,”
recognizes that Congress has the constitutional prerogative to require
that federal agencies carry out its policy directives notwithstanding
presidential direction. The problem, of course, is that Congress’s intent
is not always clear.
In the arena of environmental regulation, balancing costs and benefits
is technically challenging as well as controversial. Environmental benefits,
such as saving marine life, are often difficult to quantify and accurately
monetize. One major concern is that comparing environmental benefits
to “hard costs” tends to tip the regulatory decision-making scale against
environmental protection.
Justice Souter recently focused attention on this concern:
The difficulty that I have is if you are going to apply on at least a site-specific
basis a cost- benefit analysis, I’m not sure how it would work. In other words, it
seems to me that when you’re talking about the possible harm from pulling in a
few fish or a few plankton or a few baby clam larvae and so on, as against the
cost conceivably of millions of dollars for extending intake pipes or putting technical
expensive filtering mechanisms, you are dealing with such incommensurables
that I don’t know how on a site specific basis you would sensibly apply a costbenefit analysis. Are a thousand plankton worth a million dollars? . . . [I]f you
are going to apply cost-benefit analysis, the odds are what you are going to do is
basically eliminate the whole technology-driven point of the [CWA] statute.22

Notwithstanding this incommensurability concern, the EPA has used
cost-benefit analysis in writing the regulations to section 316(b).
Yet the critical legal question is clear: Did Congress intend to
foreclose the use of a cost-benefit analysis, or did it broadly delegate
discretion to the EPA to use a cost-benefit analysis? In 2009, the
Supreme Court of the United States answered this question in Entergy v.
Riverkeeper.23 It found that the EPA permissibly used a cost-benefit
21. Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (emphasis
added). In 2007, President Bush amended EO 12866 by issuing EO 13422. Exec. Order
No. 13422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2,763 (Jan. 23, 2007). Section 1 of the amended order required
agencies to justify proposed regulations by proving “market failure.” Shortly after
assuming office, President Obama revoked EO 13422. Exec. Order No. 13497, 74 Fed.
Reg. 6,113 (Feb. 4, 2009).
22. Transcript of oral argument at 6, Entergy v. Riverkeeper, Nos. 07-588, 07-589,
07-597, 2008 WL 5070695 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2008).
23. Entergy v. Riverkeeper, 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009). Three petitions were consolidated
in the case: Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Entergy Corp. v. EPA, 129 S. Ct. 1498 (Nov.
2, 2007) (No. 07-588); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, PSEG Fossil v. Riverkeeper, 129
S. Ct. 445 (Nov. 2, 2007) (No. 07-588); and Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Utility Water
Act Group v. Riverkeeper, 129 S. Ct. 1498 (Nov. 2, 2007) (No. 07-587). The United
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analysis in setting both the OTC system national performance standards
and variance (site-specific) provisions that allow for the departure from
those national standards.
The Court relied on the principle of judicial deference to reasonable
agency interpretations under the principles outlined in Chevron v. NRDC
as well as on its parsing of the text of section 316(b) in comparison to
other provisions in the CWA. 24 Because the Entergy decision is
important to the energy industry and significantly impacts water policy,
a closer look at the decision and the Court’s reasoning is warranted.
II. BACKGROUND P RINCIPLES
The ambitious goal of the CWA is to “restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters.”25 To
realize this goal, the CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants from
point sources to waters of the United States except as authorized by
statute. The definition of “pollutant” includes “heat,” which is treated
as a “thermal pollutant.”26 The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit program,27 which is administered by the EPA,28
regulates the discharge of pollutants to navigable waters from a “point
source” through the use of effluent limitations.29 OTC power plants are
subject to regulation under the NPDES regulatory program because they
discharge thermal effluent from a point source to waters of the United
States. To carry out Congress’s intent as to the discharge, Congress also
regulated the cooling water intake structure as part of the regulatory package.
States opposed the grant of certiorari, but supported the position of the utilities after
certiorari was granted.
24. Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron creates a two-step method
of analysis. Step one examines whether Congress unambiguously decided the issue; step
two examines the agency’s decision. To reject the agency’s decision, a court must find
that either Congress decided the issue (step 1) or that the agency’s interpretation was
unreasonable (step 2).
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
26. Id. § 1362(6).
27. States are authorized by the CWA to apply to the EPA to administer the
NPDES permit program, and are granted this authority providing the Administrator
makes the nine statutory findings. See id. § 1342(b)(1)-(9). Subject to EPA oversight,
the majority of states administer the NPDES program.
28. See generally id. § 1342.
29. The term “effluent limitation” means “any restriction established by a State or
the Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and
other constituents which are discharged from point sources into navigable waters, the waters of
the contiguous zone, or the ocean, including schedules of compliance.” Id. § 1362(11).
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Congress adopted a technology-based approach to determining pollutant
effluent limitations to be used in NPDES discharge permits. Establishing
uniform effluent limitations for industrial sources, which is done on an
industry-by-industry and pollutant-by-pollutant basis, is complex.
To accomplish this task, the EPA generally studies various industries
to determine the available technology control options. Once the
technology-based control options are identified, effluent limitations
based on the controls are determined. The effluent limitations are then
available to be incorporated into individual NPDES permits. When the
EPA has not determined an effluent limitation for a pollutant, an NPDES
permit regulates the pollutant discharge on a case-by-case basis using the
Best Professional Judgment (BPJ) of the permit writer.30
Technology-based standards are based on the level of treatment and
control within the economic means of the industrial categories, which is
another way of saying that the standards are “available” to the industry.
The limitations are reviewed at least every five years.31 In developing
technology-based effluent regulations, the EPA gathers information on
the industry’s practices, the characteristics of the pollutant discharges,
the technologies or practices used to prevent or treat the discharge, and
economic considerations.32 It then sets the regulatory requirements
based on the performance of the control technology in reducing or
eliminating that pollutant.
III. SECTIONS 301 AND 306: COSTS AND BENEFITS
Congress has specified the use of different types of technology-forcing
discharge standards to be used over time, depending on the type of the
pollutant (toxic or non-toxic) and the type of facility (existing or new).33
With respect to existing sources, Congress imposed progressively
stricter levels of pollution control with the passage of time. In some
instances, Congress mandated that the EPA consider costs and benefits.
In other instances, Congress provided little or no guidance to the EPA
regarding the role of a cost-benefit analysis.34

30. See, e.g., EPA NPDES Permit Writers’ M anual: Technology-Based Effluent
Limits, http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/chapt_05.pdf.
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(d).
32. See EPA.gov, Effluent Limitation Guidelines, http://www.epa.gov/guide/questions/
index.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2008).
33. Existing facilities are governed by 33 U.S.C. § 1311. New facilities are governed
by 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(A). In contrast, Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW)
are subject to a different technological standard, “secondary treatment.” Id. § 1316(b)(1)(B).
34. Id. § 1362(d). This section allows the prevailing party to recover costs, including
reasonable attorney fees.
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Section 316(b) makes no reference, one way or the other, to the use of
cost-benefit analysis. Nevertheless, familiarity with sections 301 and
306 is important because these sections influenced the formulation of the
section 316(b) regulations and the Supreme Court’s analysis of them.
A. BPT: Costs and Benefits
By the year 1977, the CWA required existing industrial dischargers of
non-toxic pollutants to meet discharge limits that reflect the “best
practical control technology currently available” (BPT) standard.35 In
determining BPT, Congress directed the EPA to consider “the total cost
of the application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction
benefits.”36 This is an instance where Congress clearly intended the EPA to
use a formal cost-benefit analysis.
The Conference Report also makes this clear:
The balancing test between total cost and effluent reduction benefits is intended

to limit the application of technology only where the additional degree of
effluent reduction is wholly out of proportion to the costs of achieving such a
marginal level of reduction for any class or category of sources.37

B. BATEA: “The Cost of Achieving the Effluent Reduction”
and “Other Factors”
By the year 1989, existing facilities were governed by the stricter “best
available technology economically achievable (BATEA)” standard.38
Congress directed the EP A to “take into account . . . the cost of
achieving such effluent reduction,” along with various “other factors.”39
35. Id. § 1311(b)(1)(A). This approach represented the first stage of pollutantdischarge reduction, designed to bring all sources in an industrial category up to the level
of the average of the best source in that category. See EPA v. National Crushed Stone
Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 75-76 (1980).
36. “Factors relating to the assessment of best practicable control technology
currently available to comply with subsection (b)(1) of section 1311 of this title shall include
consideration of the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction
benefits to be achieved from such application . . . and such other factors as the Administrator
deems appropriate.” 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B).
37. Congressional Research Service, A Legislative History of the Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500 (1973).
38. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A). By 1989, point sources are required to meet more
s t ringent effluent limitations based on either the “ bes t convent ional p ollut ant
control technology,” id. § 1311(b)(2)(E), or the “best available technology economically
achievable,” id. § 1311(b)(2)(A), which is applicable to discharge of toxic pollutants.
39. Id. § 1314(b)(2)(B).
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The ability of the EPA to compare costs to benefits, which was clearly
stated in the earlier BPT standard, was not expressly required for
BATEA.
Congress did not require the use of a comparative analysis. Rather, it
directed taking into account or considering certain factors as well as
“other factors.” So long as the EPA takes into account the identified
factors, the EPA arguably may apply them as it “reasonably” deems
appropriate.
The conclusion that “cost” is simply one of the identified factors to be
considered by the EPA is inescapable. Congress did not, however, assign
any identified weight to the consideration of cost. Cost was simply one
of the factors to take into account. The authority to consider “such other
factors as the Administrator deems appropriate” is sufficiently broad to
arguably allow the consideration of benefits.
The conspicuous absence of comparative cost-benefit language
arguably supports the claim that Congress did not intend for the EPA to
engage in a formal balancing of costs and benefits. The Conference
Report supports this view:
While cost should be a factor in the Administrator’s judgment, no balancing test
will be required. The Administrator will be bound by a test of reasonableness.
In this case, the reasonableness of what is ‘economically achievable’ should
reflect an evaluation of what needs to be done to move toward the elimination
of the discharge of pollutants and what is achievable through the application of
available technology without regard to cost.40

The statement “without regard to cost” suggests a less significant role
for cost considerations. More significantly, the statement “no balancing
test will be required” is ambiguous. The statement does not
clearly support the view that Congress intended to prevent the EPA
from using a cost-benefit analysis as a discretionary matter within the
“test of reasonableness.”
C. BADCT: “Cost of Achieving Such Effluent Reduction” and
“Energy Requirements”
New facilities are governed by stricter discharge requirements than
existing facilities on the theory that the controlling technology-standard
is more easily designed into a new facility than it is for an existing
facility. Congress anticipated that all dischargers ultimately would meet
the new facility standard as the existing or older facilities were replaced.41
40. Congressional Research Service, A Legislative History of the Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500 (1973) (emphases added).
41. The replacement of existing facilities with new facilities is likely to be affected
by numerous considerations. Two factors are especially significant. First, the stricter new
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New facilities are subject to “the best available demonstrated control
technology (BADCT)” that reflects “the greatest degree of effluent
reduction.”42 In establishing the standards of performance, the Administrator
“shall take into consideration the cost of achieving such effluent
reduction, and any non-water quality, environmental impact and energy
requirements.” Here again there is the grant of discretion. The reference
to authorizing the consideration of “any non-water quality, environmental
impact and energy requirements” is certainly broad enough to encompass
the consideration of the benefits associated with reducing GHGs.
IV. CWA SECTION 316
Section 316(a) requires compliance with the technology-based
discharge provisions contained in sections 301 (existing sources) and
306 (new sources). But it also allows the Administrator, after the
opportunity for a public hearing, to grant a variance to a permittee who
can demonstrate that the thermal component of any effluent limitation is
more stringent than “necessary to assure the protection and propagation
of a balanced, indigenous population of shellfish, fish, and wildlife in
and on that body of water.”43 The availability of this site-specific
facility standards tend to anchor the operation of older existing facilities. New facilities are
apt to have higher regulatory compliance costs, which is another way of saying that existing
facilities may be more economically efficient to operate. As a result, existing facility
operators may tend to be reluctant to opt into a stricter regulatory regime. Second, because
existing facilities tend to be more efficient, the stricter standards applicable to new facilities
effectively create an economic barrier to entry for new facilities.
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1). This section subjects new sources to a separate set of
standards referred to as “New Source Performance Standards” based on the “best
available demonstrated control technology” for conventional, nonconventional and toxic
pollutants. A new source is defined as a facility that commences construction after the
EPA proposes a new source performance standard. Id. § 1316(a)(2).
43. Id. § 1326(a). Section 316(a) variances are not easily secured. The “opportunity
for a public hearing” is an important practical limitation because it tends to assure that
any variance will be made following a formal adjudication with public participation. The
burden of proof is another limitation. The permittee has the burden to show that the required
limitation is “more stringent” than needed to assure the protection of the aquatic environment
of the receiving water body. Id.
The CWA also allows other types of variances. Section 301(c) allows variance from
the timetable for compliance. The Administrator may grant a variance for economic
hardship when the technology currently being used represents “the maximum use of
technology within the capability of the owner or operator” and results in “reasonable
further progress toward the elimination of the discharge of pollutants.” Id. § 1311(C).
Variances are also available for the discharge of certain non-conventional pollutants and
for certain deep-water discharges. Id. §§ 1311(g), 1311(m).
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variance is tied to protecting the marine environment and not human
health.
The companion to section 316(a) is section 316(b), which regulates
cooling water intake structures. It provides:
Any standard established pursuant to section 1311 [CWA section 301] of this title or
section 1316 [CWA section 306] of this title and applicable to a point source shall
require that the location, design, construction, and capacity of cooling water intake
structures reflect the best technology available [BTA] for minimizing adverse
environmental impact.

The stated goal of “minimizing adverse environmental impact” is narrower
and more specific than the other goals of the CWA, such as protecting
human recreational opportunities.44
The CWA is an illustration of cooperative federalism. A state may
choose to impose more stringent standards than required by federal
law.45 In California, for example, the Porter-Cologne Water Quality
Control Act (PC) is the principal water quality control law.46 Section
13142.5(b) requires that any new or expanded coastal power plant using
seawater for cooling, such as a OTC power plant, use “the best available
site design, technology, and mitigation measures feasible . . . to minimize
the intake and mortality of all forms of marine life.”47
The California Water Board, which supervises the implementation of
PC, has not yet adopted guidance on the implementation of this
provision. The stated legislative goal of PC section 13142.5(b) is to
“minimize” the intake and mortality of marine life. As with the CWA,
the word “minimize” is not defined. It may be construed to mean
to “reduce the harm to some reasonable extent.” Alternatively, it
may mean “reduce the harm to the maximum extent reasonably
possible.” Although the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
term “minimize” is not binding, the Court’s reasoning in Entergy is
nevertheless likely to be influential.

Another type is the Fundamentally Different Factors (FDF) variance under section 301(n). Id.
§ 1311(n). The EPA, with the concurrence of the affected state, may establish special
requirements for a facility that is fundamentally different with respect to one or more of
the factors relevant in developing the regulations, other than cost. In such a case, the
EPA may provide different limitations for a plant whose individual characteristics
prevent it from performing within the limits set for its industrial category. Time limits
exist, however, for applying for a FDF variance. Supporting data must be submitted to
the EPA during the rulemaking process or on information that the applicant did not have
a reasonable opportunity to submit at that time. Id. § 1311(n)(2).
44. Id. § 1251(a)(2).
45. Id. § 1370.
46. CAL . WATER CODE § 13000 et. seq. (2009).
47. CAL . WATER CODE § 13142.5(b) (2009).
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One significant difference between PC section 13142.5(b) and CWA
section 316(b) is the expressed authorization of “mitigation measures,”
which may arguably include “restoration measures.” This difference in
the inclusion of mitigation measures is significant as illustrated by the
subsequent discussion in Riverkeeper I and II, which was left undisturbed
by the Supreme Court in Entergy.48
According to the Random House Dictionary of the English Language,
which is a favorite source of authority for plain-meaning textualists, the
word “mitigate” means “to lessen in force or severity” or “to make less
severe.” The word “restore” means to “bring back into existence”
or “reestablish.”49 Section 13142.5(b) admits the argument that one may
mitigate the effect of an environmental harm through restoration,
whereas the language of section 316(b) arguably forecloses this claim.
In 1972, PC was amended to allow California to implement the
CWA.50 The state agencies administering the CWA perform the dual
function of administering both state and federal law. In executing this
responsibility, PC section 13372 mandates that federal law controls to
the extent of any inconsistency.51 The authorized state mitigation
provision ought to be applied by the regulatory authorities as well as by
the courts so as to avoid any constructional inconsistency with the CWA.
The concern that “mitigation measures” allowed by California law fall
below the minimum requirements set by federal law should be rejected.

48. See discussions infra Parts IV.B, IV.C.2.
49. M ERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (2009), http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/mitigate (defining “mitigate”), http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/restore
(defining “restore”).
50. CAL . WATER CODE § 13370(c) (2009) (Chapter 5.5 Compliance with the Provisions
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amended in 1972).
51. California Water Code, section 13372(a) provides:
This chapter shall be construed to ensure consistency with the requirements for
state programs implementing the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and acts
amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto. To the extent other provisions
of this division are consistent with the provisions of this chapter and with the
requirements for state programs implementing the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act and acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto, those provisions
apply to actions and procedures provided for in this chapter. The provisions of
this chapter shall prevail over other provisions of this division to the extent of
any inconsistency. The provisions of this chapter apply only to actions required
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and acts amendatory thereof or
supplementary thereto.
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A. Preliminary Steps Toward Section 316(b) Regulation
In 1976, the EPA issued regulations on the technological criteria
applicable to cooling water intake structures.52 In addition to its early
rulemaking efforts, the EPA issued other opinions interpreting section
316(b).53 In 1977, a coalition of electric utility companies challenged
the section 316(b) rule in Appalachian Power Co. v. Train.54 Petitioners
argued that the EPA failed to comply with the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).55 More specifically, they argued
that the EPA had neither published the Development Document in the
Federal Register nor properly incorporated the document into the rule.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the procedural
objections advanced by the plaintiffs, but it did so without reaching the
substantive merits of the rule.56 In remanding the matter, the court held
that “the Agency [EPA] on remand may take further action with respect
to the regulations should it be so advised.”57 But the EPA took no action
to republish the regulations and finally withdrew them in 1979. As a
result, the EPA continued the practice of imposing cooling water intake
conditions on a case-by-case, site-specific basis using a “best professional
judgment” standard.58
This inaction proved unsettling to environmentalists. In 1993, a
coalition of environmental groups sued the EPA to force it to adopt
regulations. This lawsuit resulted in a consent decree whereby the EPA
agreed to a timetable for issuing them. The EPA agreed to issue
regulations in three phases: Phase I would govern new facilities, Phase II
would cover large, existing power plants, and Phase III would regulate
both existing power plants not covered by Phase II and other industrial

52. EPA Rules and Regulations, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,387 (Apr. 26, 1976).
53. The EPA’s general counsel has issued a number of written opinions in connection
with specific NPDES permits. See, Op. Gen. Counsel 41 (1976); see also Op. Gen. Counsel
63 (1977); Draft Guidance for Evaluating the Adverse Impact of Cooling Water Intake
Structures on the Aquatic Environment, Section 316(b) P.L. 92-500 (1977), available at
http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/316b/files/1977AEIguid.pdf.
54. Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 566 F.2d 451, 458 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding,
among other things that the court had jurisdiction to entertain these petitions under the
Clean Water Act § 509(b)(1)(E), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(E)).
55. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (2008).
56. Appalachian Power, 566 F.2d at 456-57 (holding that the regulations, which
provided that information contained in the development document that was to be considered,
were not enforceable; the development document had not been published in the federal register
and the procedural requisites for incorporation by reference had not been satisfied).
57. Id. at 457.
58. EPA Rules and Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 32,956 (June 7, 1979).
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facilities.59 The EPA was on what would become the litigation-strewn
path to issuing section 316(b) regulations.
B. Phase I (New Facilities, Those Built After 2002)
In 2001, the EPA issued the Phase I regulations for new facilities60
built after 2002.61 New electric generating plants and manufacturers,
which withdraw more than two million gallons per day (MGD) from
waters of the United States and that use 25% or more of their intake
water for cooling,62 were governed by the Phase I rule. Smaller new
facilities were still regulated on a case-by-case basis.63
A new facility was given an option. It could choose between being
regulated under Track I or Track II. Track I set national capacity and
velocity cooling-water intake-standards.64 The EPA established that the
CC (recirculating) cooling technology reflect the BTA for minimizing
adverse environmental impacts. In doing so, Track I rejected the use of
the OTC and DC technologies for new facilities.
Under Track II, a new facility could avoid the capacity, velocity, or
“additional” requirements of Track I65 so long as the facility “can show,
in a demonstration study, ‘that the technologies employed will reduce
the level of adverse environmental impact . . . to a comparable level to
that which’ would be achieved applying Track I’s capacity and velocity
requirements.”66 This allowed a type of functional equivalency. But a
new facility could also meet the standards through so-called “restoration
measures,” such as fish-restocking or removing barriers to fish migration
in order to maintain fish and shellfish at certain levels.67
Phase I also contained a variance provision tied to the cost of
compliance. When “compliance with [a] requirement . . . would result in
59. T he P has e III Rule has been challenged in Conoco P hillips Co. v. EPA,
(Docket No. 06-60662, 5th Cir. 2008).
60. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System: Regulations Addressing
Cooling Water Intake Structures for New Facilities, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,256 (Dec. 18, 2001).
61. 40 C.F.R. § 125.83 (2009).
62. Id. § 125.81.
63. Id. § 125.80.
64. Id. § 125.84(b)-(c).
65. The facility must, however, comply with identical proportional flow requirements.
See id. § 125.84(d)(2).
66. Id. § 125.84(d)(1).
67. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System: Regulations Addressing
Cooling Water Intake Structures for New Facilities, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,280-81 (Dec. 18,
2001).
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compliance costs wholly out of proportion to the costs the EPA
considered in establishing the requirement at issue or would result in
significant adverse impacts on [air quality, water resources, or local
energy markets],” the facility may comply with “less stringent” requirements
than either Track I or II.68
In Riverkeeper v. United States EPA (Riverkeeper I), environmentalists
and industry groups challenged parts of the Phase I Rule.69 In 2004, the
Second Circuit largely upheld the EPA’s method establishing the two-track
approach to meeting BTA for minimizing adverse environmental impact.
But the court found that the restoration option available under Track II
was inconsistent with Congress’s intent. It reasoned that restoration
options70 were unrelated to “the location, design, construction, or capacity”
of a cooling intake structure.71 Thus, restoration options, such as the
creation of new spawning habitats or the restocking of fish, were not
consistent with Congress’s intent.
The court offered three additional reasons to support its conclusion
that restoration was impermissible.72 First, according to the EPA’s own
findings, assessing the cause and effect of cooling-water intake-structures
on species within an ecosystem is difficult. Congress intended for the

68. See 40 C.F.R. § 125.85. The variance language contained in the Phase II Rule
uses the words “significantly greater” rather than “wholly disproportionate.” In Entergy
Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1515 (2009), Justice Breyer dissented, emphasizing
this difference. He argued that the EPA had not adequately explained the change in its
criterion for variances. The majority concluded, however, that the EPA’s explanation was
ample. The EPA explained that the “wholly out of proportion” standard was inappropriate for
the existing facilities because those facilities lack “the greater flexibility available to new
facilities for selecting the location of their intakes and installing technologies at lower costs
relative to the costs associated with retrofitting existing facilities,” and because “economically
impracticable impacts on energy prices, production costs, and energy production . . .
could occur if large numbers of Phase II existing facilities incurred costs that were more
than ‘significantly greater’ than but not ‘wholly out of proportion’ to the costs in the
EPA’s record.” The practical difference between the two standards is yet to emerge.
69. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F .3d 174, 189, 196-97 (2d Cir. 2004)
[hereinafter Riverkeeper I] (finding that the EPA could use alternative methods for
complying with national technology-based performance standards, so long as methods
yielded at least 90% of reductions in impingement and entrainment of organisms as that
yielded under “fast track” approach to complying with standards. The court also upheld
the variance provision when facility-specific data demonstrated that compliance costs
would be wholly out of proportion to the costs used by the EPA in establishing the rule
or would result in significant adverse impacts on local air quality, water resources, or
energy markets. The court sustained the EPA’s finding that closed-cycle cooling, and
not dry cooling, was the “best technology available” for minimizing adverse environmental
impact of structures. Finally, the court found that the EPA’s decision to regulate some aspects
of structures on site-specific basis was within its authority.)
70. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System: Regulations Addressing
Cooling Water Intake Structures for New Facilities, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,256 (Dec. 18, 2001).
71. Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 2004).
72. Id. at 190.
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design of intake structures to be regulated directly and without resort to
difficult determinations involving water quality impacts. Second, section
316(a) expressly considered water quality impacts (a balanced, indigenous
wildlife population), but Congress made no reference to such impacts in
section 316(b). According to the court, Congress arguably intended to
purposefully exclude water quality impacts by omitting references to
them in section 316(b). Finally, in 1982, Congress expressly rejected a
proposed amendment to section 316(b) that would have expressly
allowed restoration measures.73 The court characterized this as “marginal
evidence” that Congress rejected restoration measures.
The environmental petitioners argued that DC should be BTA for
minimizing adverse environmental impact because it requires the least
amount of water and thus minimizes impingement and entrainment. The
court rejected this claim based on what arguably appears to be a costbenefit analysis:
[W]e think it is logical for the EPA to compare the improvements that both dry
cooling and closed-cycle cooling offer over once-through cooling. That dry
cooling is 95 percent more effective than closed-cycle cooling at eliminating
entrainment is certainly relevant, and when noting how much more expensive
dry cooling is than closed-cycle cooling, it is only fair to note how much more
effective it is as well. But comparing both closed-cycle cooling and dry cooling
to the baseline of once-through cooling adds a useful perspective on the marginal
benefits [emphasis added] of dry cooling. In other words, while it certainly sounds
substantial that dry cooling is 95 percent more effective than closed-cycle cooling, it
is undeniably relevant that that difference represents a relatively small improvement
over closed-cycle cooling at a very significant cost.74

The reference by the court to “marginal benefits” in its reasoning
inexplicably involves the use of a “cost-benefit” analysis.
C. Phase II (Existing Facilities, Those Built Before 2002)
In 2004, the EPA issued the Phase II Rule governing cooling-water
intake-structures at large,75 existing power plants.76 The EPA interpreted

73. Clean Water Act Amendments of 1982: Hearings on S. 777 & S. 2652 Before
the Subcomm. on Envtl. Pollution of the Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, U.S. Senate,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 113-14 (1982).
74. Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 195, n.22 (2d Cir. 2004).
75. Phase II applies only to existing facilities “whose primary activity is to generate
and transmit electric power and who have a design intake flow of 50 million gallons or
greater, and that use at least 25% of the water withdrawn for cooling purposes.” National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Final Regulations to Establish Requirements for
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BTA to mean the “best technology available commercially at an
economically practicable cost” and explained that “an important component
of economic practicability” is “the relationship of costs to environmental
benefits.”77
The Phase II national performance standards reflected the cost of the
control technology and the environmental benefits associated with the
use of that technology.78 The Phase II Rule also used a cost-benefit
analysis in deciding whether a variance would be allowed as a basis for
departing from the national performance standards.
The Phase II Rule does not require facilities to reduce intake flows to
the level achieved by CC systems. The EPA rejected CC cooling as BTA
for three reasons: (1) the high cost of converting to CC cooling, estimated to
be $3.5 billion, (2) the fact that other technologies approached the
performance standards associated with CC cooling, and (3) the concern
about the energy impacts and additional air pollution associated with
retrofitting.79
The national performance standards were set based on those technologies
determined by the EPA to be commercially available to the industry.
The standards were stated in terms of reducing impacts within acceptable
ranges based on the EPA’s baseline calculations:80 80% to 95% for
impingement and 60% to 90% for entrainment.81 The use of ranges was
intended to accommodate the variability associated with local environmental

Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, 66 Fed. Reg. 41,590
(July 9, 2004).
76. An existing facility is one built before 2002. 69 Fed. Reg. 41,576 (July 9,
2004).
77. 69 Fed. Reg. 41,604 (July 19, 2004).
78. In defining the “national performance standards,” the EPA assumed the application
of technologies whose benefits “approach those estimated” for CC cooling systems at a
fraction of the cost: $389 million per year compared with (1) at least $3.5 billion per year
to operate compliant CC cooling systems (or $1 billion per year to impose similar
requirements on a subset of Phase II facilities, and (2) significant reduction in the energy
output of the altered facilities. The relatively meager financial benefits of the Phase II
regulations (reduced impingement and entrainment of 1.4 billion aquatic organisms with
annualized use-benefits of $83 million, and non-use benefits of indeterminate value-when
compared to annual costs of $389 million) demonstrates that regulatory requirements were not
selected because their benefits equaled their costs. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S.
Ct. 1498, 1509 (2009).
79. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83, 102 (2d Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Riverkeeper
II]. The EPA considered a number of options for determining BTA and assessed them
“based on overall efficacy, availability, economic practicability, including economic impact
and the relationship of costs with benefits, and non-water quality environmental impacts,
including energy impacts.” Id. CC systems were considered less energy efficient than
the EPA’s chosen alternatives. 69 Fed. Reg. 41,606.
80. 40 C.F.R. § 125.93 (2009) (defining baseline calculation).
81. Id. 125.94(b)(1-2) (impingement reduction within the 80%-95% range and
entrainment reduction within the 60%-90% range).
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conditions. The EPA reasoned that impingement and entrainment would
not be as harmful to the marine environment in some locations as it
would be in other locations. The consideration of local water body
conditions is consistent with Congress’s intent under section 316(a),
which allows a variance upon the showing of “the protection and
propagation of a balanced, indigenous population of shellfish, fish, and
wildlife in and on that body of water.”82
1. Compliance Options
BTA could be achieved through various compliance alternatives or
strategies. First, a facility could use a technology whose intake flow is
commensurate with that of a CC cooling system.83 Second, a facility
could satisfy BTA by demonstrating that its existing actions “and/or
restoration measures” meet the national performance standards.84 Third,
a facility could comply by demonstrating that its future use of technologies
“and/or restoration measures” would meet the national performance
standards.85 Fourth, a facility could comply by demonstrating it has
installed or will install an approved “suite” of design technologies, such
as barrier nets, fish return systems, and aquatic filter-barrier systems.86
The fifth compliance alternative provided for two types of site-specific
variances based on economic considerations. One option was available
when a facility could demonstrate that the actual compliance costs would
be “significantly greater” than the estimated compliance costs used by
the EPA (essentially a cost-to-cost comparison) in establishing the
national performance standards.87 Thus, if the actual costs were “significantly
greater” than the costs used by the EPA, the facility could use this
option. A second type of variance was available when a facility could
demonstrate that the compliance cost of meeting the performance

82. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2009).
83. 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a)(1).
84. Id. § 125.94(a)(2).
85. Id. § 125.94(a)(3). The restoration option requires demonstrating that the
performance standards or site-specific requirements are “less feasible, less cost-effective,
or less environmentally desirable” (40 C.F.R. § 125.94(c)(1)) and demonstrating that the
restoration measures will produce ecological benefits “at a level substantially similar” to
those in the performance standard (40 C.F.R. § 125.94(c)(2)).
86. Id. §§ 125.94(a)(4), 125.99(a)-(b).
87. Id. § 129.94 (a)(5)(i).
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standards would be significantly greater than the benefits of meeting the
performance standard (a cost-to-benefit comparison).88
With respect to the site-specific variances, the EPA interpreted section
316(b) as “authorizing it to consider not only technologies but also their
effects on and benefits to the water from which the cooling water is
withdrawn.”89 The EPA also relied on the fact that for some 30 years,
the EPA had interpreted section 316(b) to allow it to consider costs and
benefits, as a component of economic practicability, in setting the sitespecific conditions for cooling water intake structures.90 The EPA also
reasoned that the legislative history to section 316(b) was consistent with
its practice.91
2. The Second Circuit Decides Riverkeeper II
Several states and environmental organizations, as well as industry
groups and power companies challenged the Phase II regulations92 in
Riverkeeper v. EPA (Riverkeeper II).93 The states and environmental
organizations claimed that the EPA failed to give adequate notice that it
would allow site-specific variances on cost-to-cost comparative analysis.
They also objected to variances being available based on cost-benefit
considerations. Other complaints included that the EPA improperly
rejected CC cooling as BTA, that the EPA exceeded its authority by
88. If the Director determines that data specific to your facility demonstrate that
the costs of compliance under alternatives in paragraphs (a)(2) through (4) of this section
would be significantly greater than the benefits (emphasis added) of complying with the
applicable performance standards at your facility, the Director must make a site-specific
determination of best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact
. . . The Director’s site-specific determination may conclude that design and construction
technologies, operational measures, and/or restoration measures in addition to those
already in place are not justified because the costs would be significantly greater than
the benefits at your facility (emphasis added). Id. § 125.94(5)(ii).
89. Id. § 125.94 (a)(5)(i).
90. See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1509 (2009).
91. 118 Cong. Rec. 33,762 (1972), reprinted in 1 Legislative History of the Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 118th Cong. 264 (1973) (statement of
Representative Don H. Clausen).
92. State petitioners included Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware, M assachusetts,
New Jersey, and New York. The environmental petitioners included Riverkeeper, Inc.,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Waterkeeper Alliance, Soundkeeper, Inc., Scenic Hudson,
Inc., Save the Bay-People for Narragansett Bay, Friends of Casco Bay, American Littoral
Society, Delaware Riverkeeper Network, Hackensack Riverkeeper, Inc., New York/New
Jersey Baykeeper, Santa Monica Baykeeper, San Diego Baykeeper, California Coastkeeper,
Columbia Riverkeeper, Conservation Law Foundation, and Surfrider Foundation. The
industry petitions included Entergy Corporation (Entergy), the Utility Water Act Group
(UWAG), and PSEG Fossil LLC, and the PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG).
93. Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2007). The petitions for review were
initially consolidated in the Ninth Circuit, but were transferred to the Second Circuit pursuant to
28 U.S.C., section 2112(a)(5). Id. at 95.
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using selected ranges of acceptable performance rather than a singlenumeric performance standard, and that the use of restoration measures
could be utilized as a means of compliance.94
Not to be outdone, the industry groups also objected to aspects of the
Phase II Rule. They argued that the EPA improperly required the
evaluation of qualitative non-use benefits in site-specific cost-benefit
analyses. They also claimed that section 316(b) should not apply to
existing facilities, that the EPA’s definition of “adverse environmental
impact” was insufficiently supported by the record, and that the record
did not support the EPA’s assumption of zero-entrainment survival.95
With respect to the argument about costs, the Second Circuit found
that Congress allowed a limited consideration of costs by the EPA in
deciding whether the technology was “available.” According to the
court, costs could only be considered in one of two ways. First, the EPA
could determine whether the costs of a technology could be reasonably
borne by the industry. Second, the EPA could consider the costeffectiveness of competing technologies in determining BTA so long as
the performance goal or end-state (minimizing adverse environmental
impact) was essentially the same.96
Site-specific variances based on a cost-to-cost comparison might be
used, but the benchmark comparison contained in the Phase II Rule
violated the notice and comment provisions of the APA. The court
found that the EPA failed to disclose the cost estimates for the named
existing facilities.97 As a result, the public had no opportunity to challenge
those cost estimates. Therefore, the EPA’s methodology and general
cost data did not satisfy the public notice and comment requirements of
the APA.
Consequently, the court remanded the cost-to-cost variance provisions
to the EPA on procedural grounds without reaching the substantive
94. See generally Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2007).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 98. The Second Circuit had previously found that the EPA could allow
variances despite the absence of explicit statutory authority in section 316(b). The court
reasoned:
Section 316(b)’s silence with respect to variances does not . . . equal an unambiguous
prohibition. In the absence of such a statutory bar, we think, consistent with
precedent, that it is reasonable for the EPA to allow variances from regulations
promulgated pursuant to section 316(b), for a regulatory system which allows
flexibility, and a lessening of firm proscriptions in a proper case, can lend
strength to the system as a whole. Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d at 193.
97. Riverkeeper II, 475 F.3d 83, 111 (2d Cir. 2007).

185

MINA N (D O N OT D E LET E)

2/22/2016 9:19 AM

merits.98 Although the court did not reach the merits of the EPA’s use of
site-specific cost-to-cost variances, it waved some yellow flags of
caution to be considered by the EPA on remand:
Finally, we note that to the extent that facilities on highly degraded waterbodies
with relatively low wildlife levels face high compliance costs to achieve the
national performance standards, those facilities may qualify for the cost-cost
variance if such variance is retained on remand.99

The court’s Maalox moment occurred when it expressed its “discomfort”
with the adoption of the “significantly greater than” cost trigger. It
observed that “we have not found entirely persuasive the EP A’s
position” for using the “significantly greater than” standard in the Phase
II Rule since it had previously used a “wholly disproportionate” standard
in Phase I.100
The court also found that Congress had foreclosed the use of a
comparative cost-benefit analysis.101 Although the text of section 316(b)
did not expressly dictate this result, the contextual cross-references to
sections 301 and 306, according to the court, supported this result. The
court reasoned that those sections provided it with the “invitation” to
discern the factors Congress intended the EPA to use in establishing
BTA. The court looked for guidance at the broader statutory scheme of
which section 316(b) was a part.102
Congress did not recognize the use of a cost-benefit analysis with
respect to current existing sources (section 301) or new sources (section
306). The court found that the only explicit direction by Congress for
the use of a cost-benefit analysis was to the now-obsolete BPT standard.
The implication, therefore, was that Congress intended to preclude its
use with respect to section 316(b). The court reasoned that when Congress
intended the use of a cost-benefit analysis, it clearly had expressed its
intent. The failure to do so ought to be taken as intentionally and
purposely precluding the use of a cost-benefit analysis.103
But what about the fact that the EPA based its rejection of DC in favor
of the CC on cost-benefit considerations approved in Riverkeeper I?
The court swept this inconsistency in reasoning to one side as dicta in a
footnote:

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
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In our discussion of the EPA’s choice of closed-cycle, rather than dry, cooling
as BTA for Phase I facilities, we noted that “dry cooling costs more than ten
times as much per year as closed-cycle wet cooling,” but emphasized that “it is
es t imated to reduce w ater intake by only an additional 5 percent relative
t o once-through cooling.” We acknowledged that dry cooling is both much
more effective and much more expensive than closed-cycle cooling in absolute
terms, but stressed that, as compared to the baseline of once-through cooling
systems, the marginal benefits of dry cooling were small: “it is undeniably
relevant that that difference represents a relatively small improvement over closedcycle cooling at a very significant cost.” In dicta, we characterized this mode of
analysis as “relevant” and stated that it “adds a useful perspective,” but did not
treat it as the fulcrum of our analysis. Ultimately, we deferred to the EPA’s
determination insofar as it was based on the grounds that dry cooling was too
expensive for industry reasonably to bear and that dry cooling has negative
environmental effects best left to the considered judgment of the Agency.104

3. The Supreme Court Grants Certiorari and Hears
Oral Argument
In 2008, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in Entergy v.
EPA to review the Second Circuit’s Riverkeeper II decision. Entergy
was granted to consider the following question: Whether section 316(b)
authorizes the EPA to compare costs with benefits in determining the
“best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact” at
cooling-water intake-structures.105 The Court narrowly framed the issue.
Nevertheless, its reasoning on the cost-benefit analysis may have
broader implications to environmental law generally.
The core arguments made to the Court were reflected in opening
statements made on December 2, 2008. Mr. Joseffer, Deputy Solicitor
General, Department of Justice, argued that the Second Circuit
incorrectly applied Chevron and the EPA’s Phase II Rule was entitled to
deference:
For more than 30 years, EPA has construed the Clean Water Act to permit it to
consider the relationship between costs and benefits in setting limits on water
intake. The court of appeals’ unprecedented limitation of that discretion is wrong as
a matter of basic Chevron interpretive principles for at least three reasons.
First, the controlling statutory standard, which looks to the best technology
available for minimizing adverse environmental impacts, is ambiguous and does
not preclude EPA’s interpretation, especially in light of the statute’s other “best
technology” provisions, two of which expressly require consideration of the
relationship between costs and benefits.

104.
105.

Id. at 99 n.11 (quoting Riverkeeper I, 358 F.3d 174, 194 n.22 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Entergy Corp. v. EPA, 128 S. Ct. 1867 (2008).
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Second, there is no indication that Congress determined for itself that the
benefits of stricter regulations would in fact outweigh their costs . . . There is no
indication in either the context or the history of the statute that Congress
determined for itself that the benefits of stricter regulations would in fact justify
their costs. Instead the indication is that Congress left that to the agency.
Congress took a very careful look at the separate issue of the discharge of
pollutants and legislated numerous very specific provisions concerning the discharge
of pollutants. But when it came to water intake, the Congress gave scant attention to
that at all and included only this one very general provision in the act on that
subject.106

In her opening statement, Ms. Mahoney, representing the industry
petitioners, also argued that the EPA’s Rule was entitled to Chevron
deference:
I would like to start with just setting the stage here. For almost 30 years now,
the Executive Branch has had an executive order through all administrations that
requires a cost-benefit analysis to be done whenever regulations are adopted.
And that’s because the Executive Branch considers that to be just an essential
component of reasoned decision-making.
So this Court should not be quick to conclude that Congress intended to deprive
the agency of the tools that it needs to come up with reasoned answers to these
vexing problems in the absence—[of Congress unambiguously foreclosing a
cost-benefit analysis].107

The petitioners argued that cost-benefit analysis was a part of everyday
life. In fact, Justice Breyer had made the same point in Breaking the
Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation.
In everyday life, people routinely weigh costs against benefits in deciding whether to
do something. If a bigger car would be safer than a smaller and less expensive
one, a person must decide whether the extra expense (of both the larger car and
the subsequent gasoline purchases) is justified by the safety and other benefits.
Similarly, if a better home fire alarm would cost more than a traditional one, or
if expensive new insulation would be more fire-resistant than the insulation already
installed in a house, the homeowner must decide whether the added safety benefit
justifies the added cost.108

Mr. Lazarus, representing the environmental organizations, argued that
Congress had foreclosed the EPA from using a cost-benefit approach. In
his view, Congress’s intent was clear. He began his opening statement as
follows:
In section 316(b), Congress did not authorize EPA to decide that the benefits of
minimizing adverse environmental impact did not justify the cost of available
technology. EPA has no authority in any circumstance to decide that fish aren’t
worth a certain amount of cost. So EPA never has the authority, in any context,

106. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5, Entergy, 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009) (No. 07-588).
107. Id. at 19.
108. Brief for the Respondent at 13-14, Entergy, 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009), http://www.
abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-597_RespondentFederalParties.pdf.
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to weigh costs against benefits. The reason why we think that would not lead to
the kind of absurd circumstances they’re [opposing counsel] suggesting is not
because . . . EPA has that authority. It’s because we don’t think that those kinds
of absurd circumstances result from the cost-benefit balance mandated by
Congress.
There are . . . safeguards in the statutory language, its plain meaning, which would
guard against any possibility that a regulated facility would have to spend millions or
hundreds of millions or billions of dollars to protect just a few fish . . . I mean, it
would never happen . . .109

4. The Supreme Court Upholds the EPA’s Use of
Cost-Benefit Analysis
On April 1, 2009, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit in a
6-3 decision. The majority found that the EPA had appropriately used a
cost-benefit analysis in setting the BTA national performance standards
and in allowing for variances from those standards based on cost-benefit
considerations.110
The majority offered two principal justifications to support its
conclusion. First, it relied on Chevron v. NRDC, which established the
level of judicial deference to be given to agency rulemaking
interpretations.111 The familiar first step of Chevron examines whether
Congress has spoken to the question in issue.112 If it has, Congress’s
intent must be followed unless found to be unconstitutional or otherwise
legally defective. On this point, the majority was unwilling to accept the
argument that Congress’s failure to preclude the use of a cost-benefit
analysis ought to be considered a prohibition. Justice Stevens, writing in
dissent, emphasized that the legislative history to the CWA demonstrated that
Congress had foreclosed the use of a cost-benefit analysis.113
The majority saw the issue in terms of the second step of Chevron.114
If Congress has not spoken on the issue, which applied because
Congress had not defined the key statutory terms or specified the factors
to be used by the EPA, Chevron limits a court to considering whether the
EPA’s interpretation of the statute is “reasonable.”

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Entergy, 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009).
Entergy, 129 S. Ct. at 1510.
Chevron, Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Entergy, 129 S. Ct. at 1505 n.4.
Id. at 1521-22.
Id. at 1505.
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The majority found that the EPA’s use of cost-benefit analysis was
reasonable and, therefore, should be sustained.115 The word “best” was
considered a relative term. Although the Court conceded that the Second
Circuit had offered a plausible construction of section 316(b), the Court
rejected its conclusion that the “best technology” required the greatest
reduction in adverse environmental impacts. The Court found that “best
technology” also could be construed to refer to the technology that
“most efficiently” produced the end result (minimizing adverse
environmental impact) even though that end result might be somewhat
less than optimal.116 The EPA’s decision as to the “best” method for
“minimizing environmental impact” was to be judged under the standard of
reasonableness.117
This conclusion was also supported by the fact that when Congress
intended to mandate the “greatest” reduction in water pollution, it did so
in plain language.118 The Court cited section 301(b)(2)(A) (requiring
“elimination of discharges of all pollutants if . . . technologically and
economically achievable) and section 306 (referencing “a standard
permitting no discharge of pollutants”), and then the Court compared
those sections to the “less ambitious goal” of minimizing the adverse
environmental impact stated in 316(b).119 This comparison, combined
with Congress’s silence, persuaded the majority that Congress had not
clearly foreclosed the use of a cost-benefit analysis.
The Court also rejected the Second Circuit’s reliance on the increased
tightening of pollution control standards by Congress as a basis for
deciding whether a cost-benefit analysis was allowed under section
316(b). The Court found:
The Second Circuit, in rejecting the EPA’s use of cost-benefit analysis, relied
in part on the propositions that (1) cost-benefit analysis is precluded under the
[301 and 306] tests; and (2) that, insofar as the permissibility of cost-benefit
analysis is concerned, the BTA test [316] is to be treated the same as those two.
It is not obvious to us that the first of these propositions is correct, but we need
not pursue that point, since we assuredly do not agree with the second.120

In rejecting the Second Circuit’s structural analysis of the CWA, the
Court reasoned that the text as well as goals (eliminating discharges) of
section 301 and section 306 (no discharges) differed from both the text
and goal (minimizing impact) of section 316(b). In addition, another
significant difference was present. Congress identified specific factors
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
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to be considered by the EPA in administering the provisions of sections
301 and 306, whereas it had not included any such factors in section
316(b). In sum, these considerations led to Court to adopt the view that
Congress intended to give the EPA more discretion in formulating BTA
than it had under sections 301 and 306.121
The Court also rejected the argument that Congress’s silence ought to
be taken as a prohibition. If silence prohibits the consideration of
benefits, it reasoned, then it also prohibits the limited use of costs, which
the Second Circuit had used in its analysis, because section 316(b) is
silent on the use of both costs and benefits.122 Allowing the EPA to
consider costs but not benefits, therefore, was logically inconsistent.
Moreover, the premise of the silence-is-a-prohibition argument leads
to the implausible result that the EPA could not consider any factors in
implementing section 316(b). The more reasonable result, the Court
reasoned, is that Congress’s silence ought not to be construed as a
prohibition but, rather, as its refusal to tie the hands of the EPA in
deciding whether and how to use a cost-benefit analysis.123
In short, the Court found that Congress did not intend to establish a
statutory formula where utilities would be required to spend millions of
dollars to save a few fish. No statutory basis exists for limiting the
principle of cost-benefit analysis to situations where the benefits are de
minimis rather than significantly disproportionate.124
The argument advanced by the environmentalists that “this would
never happen” because the EPA would find the technology “unavailable”
was rejected.125 The Court consigned its response to this argument to a
footnote:
Respondents concede that the term “available” is ambiguous, as it could mean
either technologically feasible or economically feasible. But any ambiguity in the
term “available” is largely irrelevant. Regardless of the criteria that render a
technology “available,” the EPA would still have to determine which available
technology is the “best” one. And as discussed above, that determination may
well involve consideration of the technology’s relative costs and benefits.126

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 1508.
Id. at 1508.
Id.
Id. at 1510.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Entergy, 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009).
Entergy, 129 S. Ct. at 1506 n.5.
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Given that competing constructions were reasonable, deference to the
EPA under Chevron was appropriate.
The phrase “minimizing adverse environmental impact” was not
determinative. The Court reasoned that the word “minimizing” also can
have different meanings. In the context of the CWA, “minimizing” does
not necessarily mean “reducing impacts to the greatest extent possible.”
Rather, “minimizing” suggests that Congress intended for the EPA to
have discretion in determining the amount of the reduction warranted in
light of the benefits derived from the reductions and the costs of
achieving them. In short, minimizing also connotes reasonableness.
V. CONCLUSION
CWA section 316(b) regulates power plant cooling-water intakestructures. As previously discussed, this section is vitally important to
the power industry, consumers, and the environment. Thus, its
administration by the EPA and state regulators has national consequences.
The EPA’s Phase II regulations implementing section 316(b) apply to
large, existing power plants built before 2002 that use once-throughcooling (OTC). These power plants must comply with the statutory
mandate “best technolog[ies] available (BTA) for minimizing adverse
environmental impact.”127
The process of comparing costs and benefits in environmental
regulation is controversial in a large measure because of the difficulty of
monetizing environmental benefits and making a comparison to “hard”
costs. How does one put a dollar price on protecting, for example, fish
larvae that are destroyed by OTC? The difficulty of comparing
incommensurables tends to tip the regulatory scale against environmental
protection, which, of course, is the reason that the practice of costbenefit analysis is controversial.
In formulating the BTA regulations, the EPA compared the costs of
retrofitting existing power plants, as well as other costs, such as additional
consumer costs for electricity and the increased production of greenhouse
gases (GHGs), with the benefits of preventing the destruction of billions
of marine organisms. Opponents to the OTC regulations argued that this
violated the CWA and Congress’s intent.
In Entergy v. Riverkeeper, the Supreme Court applied the Chevron
deferential standard to the challenge. In the Court’s view, the EPA’s
interpretation of Congress’s direction on BTA for minimizing adverse
environmental impact was reasonable. Congress, the Court reasoned,
had not clearly precluded the EPA from using a cost-benefit analysis.
127.
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Consequently, the EPA’s cost-benefit comparison in formulating the
OTC national performance and site-specific variance regulations was
sustainable. The Court also sustained the EPA’s decision not to require
the use of the more marine friendly closed-cycle (CC) cooling technology
as BTA based on cost-benefit considerations. In upholding the EPA, the
Court reversed the Second Circuit’s decision in Riverkeeper II.
Whether the Supreme Court’s decision will be the final say is not
clear. Although the EPA’s approach reflected approximately 30 years of
practice and, therefore, will not be easily changed, the regulations were
formulated during the Bush Administration. The Obama Administration
may choose to chart a different course for the EPA, which they have
done under the Clean Air Act and the regulation of GHGs.
Lisa Jackson, the current Secretary of the EPA, headed the New Jersey
environmental agency prior to joining the Obama Administration. New
Jersey was one of the states that challenged the Phase II regulations. Her
position regarding the Phase II regulations will be influential. In the
end, the change in administrations may be more significant than the
Court’s opinion, which, after all, was based on deference to the EPA’s
rulemaking.
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